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Abstract
We look at the implications of uncertain monetary policy preferences for the targeting and
contracting approach to monetary stability. It turns out that in presence of uncertain preferences a
linear  incentive contract in the sense of Walsh (1995) performs better in terms of social welfare than
an explicit inflation  target as proposed by Svensson (1997). The reason is that, although both
approaches can get rid of the inflationary bias, the impact of uncertain preferences on the variance of
inflation will be considerably higher with an inflation target. We also find that on top of an optimal
linear contract or target, a quadratic contract, in the sense of Rogoff's (1985) "weight-conservative"
central  banker, improves the outcome. In the case of an inflation target, a more conservative banker
is needed than with a Walsh contract.
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1 Introduction
(2)
In the literature on reform of monetary institutions two ways have been advocated to reach low
inflation.  A survey of this literature can be found in Eijffinger and De Haan (1996).
The first is the legislative approach, i.e. to establish by law a independent central bank with an
exclusive mandate for price stability. The major academic contribution in this area is Rogoff (1985).
Rogoff develops a model in where monetary policy is delegated to a central banker (the agent) who is
more inflation averse than society (the principal). The result is a lower inflation rate, but this is at the
expense of a distorted response to output shocks. Thus, the Rogoff model features the famous
credibility-flexibility trade-off.
The second is the targeting or contracting approach to monetary policy. The idea is to let the
political principal of the central bank impose an explicit inflation target for monetary policy and make
the central bank governor explicitly accountable for his success in meeting this target. Academic
contributions in this area are Persson and Tabellini (1993), Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997).
Walsh has shown that an optimal linear inflation contract can eliminate the inflationary bias without
distorting stabilisation policy. Thus the credibility-flexibility trade-off is eliminated
3 and makes
inflation targeting superior to Rogoff's conservative central banker. Moreover, Svensson (1997) has
shown that the linear contract can be mapped into an optimal inflation target. This means that these
delegation arrangements are equivalent. They are both able to produce the pre-commitment outcome.
However, both Walsh (1995) and Svensson (1997) on the one hand, and Rogoff (1985) on the other
assume symmetric information in the principal-agent relationship. More specific, they assume that
both the political principal and the private sector know the central banker's preferences.
This assumption was abandoned  by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) and - most recently - by
Beetsma and Jensen (1997).
Building on the contracting approach, Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997) demonstrated that if a
monopolistic trade union has more information about productivity shocks than the principal,
maximum social welfare can be achieved by having a conservative central banker with perverse
preferences on top of the contract. Thus, - notwithstanding an optimal contract - Rogoff's
conservative central banker is restored.
                                               
2 The views are those of the authors and not necessarily those of the Bank of England. The authors are grateful for
helpful comments by Sudipto Bhattacharya, Chris Waller, Charles Goodhart, seminar paricipants at the LSE and the
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3  However, McCallum (1995) argues that the Walsh contract merely shifts the credibility problem from the
policymaker to the principal.3
Beetsma and Jensen (1997), building on earlier work on preference uncertainty by Briault, Haldane
and King (1996), Nolan and Schaling (1996) and Eijffinger, Hoeberichts and Schaling (1997),  derive
the very interesting result that - if the private sector and the political principal have imperfect
information about the central banker's preferences - the equivalence between the linear Walsh
contract and the Svensson inflation target breaks down. They show that the optimal linear inflation
contract performs strictly better than the optimal inflation target when there is uncertainty about the
central banker's preferences.
However, they model the central banker's preference uncertainty as 'pure' uncertainty. This implies
that in their model there is no effect from preference uncertainty on the private sector's inflation
expectations. Thus, inflation expectations are invariant to this kind of monetary policy uncertainty.
In this paper, buillding on our earlier work in this area
4, we investigate the effects of relaxing this
restriction. Using a model that is otherwise similar to theirs, we find results that are very different -
and sometimes - exactly the opposite - of the Beetsma and Jensen (1997) model.
For instance, we find that it is optimal for the government to impose an inflation target on the central
bank which depends on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences. This is in sharp contrast to
Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation target does not depend on the degree
of prefence uncertainty and is the same as in the Svensson (1997) model. Therefore here - contrary to
BJ -  certainty equivalence does not hold, and the optimal inflation target with uncertain central bank
preferences does not correspond to the optimal target derived by Svensson (1997) in the absence of
uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Further, for the case of the Walsh contract we find  that it is optimal to offer a linear inflation
contract to a central banker that does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences.
Again, this is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997) (hereafter BJ), who find that the
optimal linear contract does depend on the degree of preference uncertainty. Here our result is the
same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference uncertainty. Hence, certainty equivalence
does hold and the optimal linear inflation contract with uncertain central bank preferences is identical
to the optimal Walsh contract in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Finally, we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal delegation
arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic contract. Here the
quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker. Again, this is
different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a combination of a linear inflation contract,
an inflation target and a quadratic contract performs best.
Moreover, our result is in line with Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997), and hence suggests that their
'restoration' of Rogoff appears to be a very robust result indeed.
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The paper is organised into six remaining sections followed by four appendices. In Section 2 we
present the model. Section 3 looks at the optimal inflation target. In Section 4 we examine the linear
inflation contract. Section 5 compares the inflation target with the linear contract. Section 6
considers quadratic contracts. Our conclusions are given in Section 7. The appendices provides the
derivation of inflation expectations in the presence of non-linearities, the optimal inflation target, the
optimal linear contract and the characterisation of quadratic contracts.
2 The Model
We use a standard credibility model  [Walsh (1995), Svensson (1997)]. In  line with the credibility
literature output is described by a standard reduced-form Lucas supply function:
yE =- + () pp e (2.1)
where y is (the natural log of) output; inflation is denoted by p  and nominal wage contracts signed at time
t-1 are proxied by the private sector's expected inflation rate. e is a supply shock with  [] Ee= 0a n d
[] E es e
22 = . From these distributional characteristics it follows that the log of the natural rate of output is
zero.
The welfare loss of the government (and of society) is given as
() () [] LE y y
GG =- + -
1
2
22 ** pp y
* > 0 (2.2)
where the government's inflation target is  p
* , and  y
* denotes the government's preferred value for
output. Given this specification it follows that the  government's  relative weight of inflation stabilisation
relative to output stabilisation - by convenient normalisation - is unity. This simplifies the algebra without
affecting the generality of results.5
2.1 No Delegation of Monetary Policy
Now following Svensson (1997) and Beetsma and Jensen (1997),  purely for illlustrative purposes we first
discuss the benchmark cases of pre-commitment and discretion and then delegation arrangements. This
means that for the moment monetary  policy is not delegated to an independent central bank, but set
directly by the government.
Pre-commitment:
Monetary  policy involves the choice of the inflation rate, which is assumed to be under the direct control
of the authority who is in charge of monetary policy. The benchmark solution is obtained when the
government is able to commit ex ante to some announced inflation rate. The optimal state-contingent
monetary policy rule is found by minimising equation (2.2)  subject to (2.1) and the restriction that inflation
equals announced inflation on average. The solution is characterised by the following expressions for
respectively, expected inflation, the variances of inflation and output, and the government's welfare loss
[] E
Gpp =
* , Varps e =
1
4
2 , Vary Var =p
L
y G =+
* 2
2
2
1
4
s e (2.3)
Discretion:
As is well known, the policy rule that implies (2.3) is time-inconsistent and therefore not credible [Persson
and Tabellini (1990)] if implemented by a goverment whose objective function is given by equation (2.1).
Once nominal wages have been set, the government has the incentive to raise the inflation rate in order to
stimulate output. To satisfy the incentive constraint, the equilibrium inflation rate must be optimal for the
government when it takes wages and thus inflationary  expectations as given. The discretionary equilibrium
is found by minimising (2.2) subject to (2.1), taking inflation expectations as given. This yields
5:
[] Ey
G pp =+
**
Ly
G =+
* 2 2 1
4
s e (2.4)
Expected inflation exceeds the optimal inflation rate by  y
*because of the incentive to create surprise
inflation in order to bring output closer to its target  y
* > 0 . Clearly, social welfare is higher under pre-
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commitment than under discretion. Hence, the government may try to improve its utility by delegating
monetary policy to an independent central bank. 
2.2 Delegation of  Monetary Policy
For the remainder of the paper we assume that actual monetary policy is delegated to a central bank
that has full instrument independence but uncertain preferences. More specificically, we assume that
the central bank has the following loss function:
() () () [] Ly y x
CB =- + --
1
2
1
22 ** pp (2.5)
where  xis a stochastic parameter unobserved by both the government and the private sector. Thus,
the central bank's weight on inflation stabilisation is continuously hit by the preference disturbance
term x, which is a random variable with Ex [] = 0and [] Ex x
2 2 =s . Moreover, it is assumed that  x is
independent of e , hence  [] Ex e= 0, and that x <1with probability one.
This specification follows Briault, Haldane and King (1996) and Nolan and Schaling (1996), and
differs from other authors who have stressed the role of imperfect information about the central
bank's preferences
6.
The timing of events is as follows. First monetary policy is  delegated to the central banker. Then
inflation expectations are formed. Next, the supply shock, e , hits the economy and, finally, monetary
policy is selected by setting the inflation rate.
3 The Optimal Inflation Target
We now consider the case of delegation with an inflation target. This means that the central bank no
longer has goal independence. Rather the government imposes its own inflation target for the central
bank to adhere to. This is similar to the situation in the UK where the Bank of England sets short-
term interest rates independently, but where the inflation target (for this period 2.5%) is set by the
government. Under the above arrangements the central bank's loss function becomes
                                               
6  For example, Beetsma and Jensen (1997) constrain the sum of the weights on () yy -
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to be
() () 112 ++ -= xx , as in society's loss function, but they assume the relative weights on output and inflation
variances random.  Using the notation of this paper, the BJ results are obtained by having
() () () () [] Lx y y x
CB =+-+ --
1
2
11
22 ** pp .  Our specification has the implication that inflation expectations
for any given monetary regime depend on s x
2 .  This allows us to derive results that are very different - and sometimes
the opposite - of their model.7
() () () [] Ly y x
CB b '* =- + --
1
2
1
22
pp (3.1)
where p
b is the central bank's inflation target that is chosen by the government.
The central bank sets monetary policy, which involves the choice of the inflation rate. The central
bank then sets inflation
7 so as to minimise (3.1) subject to (2.1), having observed the supply shock
and taking inflation expectations as given.
The first-order condition for a minimum implies the following reaction function
() () pp p p e =+
-
-- +
bb e
x
y
1
2
* (3.2)
The term () ppe
be -+ is the output level consistent with the inflation target. It follows upon
substituting p
b for p in (2.1). If y
* exceeds this level, the central bank has an incentive to set
inflation above the inflation target.
An important property of  (3.2) is that the effects of preference shocks on inflation are asymmetric.  To see
this consider the following example.
Setting  () y
be * -- + = ppe1 and p
b = 0 , if there is no preference uncertainty, implies that inflation is
0 50% . .  Now, if x = + 0.50, inflation increases by 17 basispoints to 0 67%. .  However a negative
preference shock of the same size decreases inflation by 10 basispoints to 0.40%. Hence, a positive
preference shock has more inflationary impact than the disinflationary impact of a negative shock.
The above example was constructed for a given level of expected inflation.  To solve for private sector
inflation  expectations take the mathematical expectation (at time t -1) of equation (3.2).
8 This yields
pp
eby =+ F
* where F=
+
-
4
4
2
2
s
s
x
x
(3.3)
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8 The technical issue here, as we show  in Appendix A, is that this involves taking expectations in the presence of non-
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It is useful to consider the limiting value of p
e  for  the case without preference uncertainty
s
pp
x
eb y
2 0 ®
=+ lim
* (3.4)
Equations (3.3) and (3.4) indicate that inflation expectations are proportional to the output bias y
*and the
inflation target imposed by the government, a familiar conclusion in the literature.  However (3.3) differs in
a significant way from (3.4), as a result of uncertainty regarding the central bank's preferences. It can be
seen that with uncertainty about inflation stabilisation preferences expected inflation is higher than in the
standard case. The reason is that positive shocks to x- more emphasis on output stabilisation - are more
inflationary than negative shocks - more emphasis on inflation stabilisation - are disinflationary. With
equal probabilities of positive and negative shocks to the central banker's preferences
9, expected inflation
will be adjusted upwards and the more so the higher the variance of the shocks hitting the central bank's
preferences.
This can be restated in a more technical way by noting that the expectation of inflation involves the
expectation of a convex function  of the preference shock,which will always be higher than the value of this
function at the (zero) expected value of the preference shock. Hence the channel through which the
uncertainty affects expected inflation is the Jensen's inequality effect
10.
Realised inflation under a given target follows upon inserting (3.3) back into (3.2)
()
pp e =+
--
-
æ
è ç
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ø ÷ -
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e x
x
y
x
11
2
1
2
F * (3.5)
It is important to realise that now monetary policy will on average not coincide with policy in the
absence of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences. If we set the preference shock equal to
zero in (3.5), monetary policy will still react to the degree of preference uncertainty (through the
variance term in F). Thus, in this respect certainty equivalence does not hold. The reason is that the
central banker optimises its policy taking inflation expectations as given. Since private sector inflation
expectations depend on the second moment of the distribution of x(see equation (3.3)) so does the
central bank's monetary policy stance.
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model because they constrain the sum of the weights on output and inflation in the central banker's loss function to be
the same as in  society's loss function.9
Combining (2.1) and (3.5) yields realised output as
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y
x
x
y
x
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From (3.5) and (3.6) it can be seen that inflation and output differ from their expected values when
either x or e differ from their (zero) expected values.
For the moment, assume that the supply shock is zero. Then the way the model works is extremely
simple. Suppose there is a positive shock to the central banker's preferences (pp >
e ). This implies
that output will be above the natural rate. Conversely, if there is a negative realisation of  x (more
emphasis on inflation stabilisation) actual inflation will be lower than expected.  Consequently, output
will be below its natural level.
It is important to realise that the inflation surprise (be it positive or negative) is completely unaffected
by the level of the imposed inflation target. Put diffferently, the delegation parameter p
b, has no
effect on how the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences is transmitted to inflation and
output. Here we show that their result continues to hold when private sector inflation expectations
reflect the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences (through the termF).
To see this consider equation (3.3). A change in p
b changes inflation expectations one-for-one.
Hence, the central banker's incentive to set inflation above the target is unaffected, because
() ppe
be -+  in (3.2) is unaffected.
Put differently, the choice of inflation target has no implications for stabilisation policy. By inspecting
(3.5) and (3.6), it can be seen that the term p
b does not affect the deviations of realised inflation
from expectations () pp -
e or output from its (zero) trend. Thus, the variances of output and
inflation are independent from the choice of inflation target.
For completeness these variances are
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To find the optimal inflation target, the government chooses the value of p
b that minimises L
G
subject to (3.3) , (3.5) and (3.6).10
The optimal inflation target, denoted by p
b*is:
11
pp
b y
** * =- F (3.9)
As before it is useful to consider the limiting value of p
b* for  the case without preference uncertainty
s
pp
x
b y
20 ®
=- lim
** * (3.10)
This is the Svensson (1997) result about the 'inflation target-conservative' central bank where the
inflation target equals the socially best inflation rate less the inflation bias.
If s x
2 0 > , equation (3.9) reveals that it is optimal for the government to impose an inflation target on
the central bank which depends on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences. This is in sharp
contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation target does not depend on
the degree of prefence uncertainty and is the same as in the Svensson (1997) model. Therefore here -
contrary to BJ -  certainty equivalence does not hold, and p
b*does not correspond to the optimal
target derived by Svensson (1997) in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
The intuition behind our result is simple. First, from (3.7) and (3.8) we know that the choice of
inflation target has no effect on the stochastic components of the goverment's loss function. Thus, the
inflation target is chosen so as to equal expected inflation to the socially desirable inflation rate.
Since, expected inflation depends on s x
2 (through F), the optimal inflation target also depends on
s x
2. Finally, comparing (3.9) with (3.10), it can be seen that with preference uncertainty the optimal
inflation target is 'stricter' (lower) than the Svensson target. The reason is as follows. As is clear from
(3.3), central banker uncertainty implies higher inflation expectations. To offset this additional
inflation bias the degree of 'target conservativeness' has to increase as well.
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4 The Optimal Linear Inflation Contract
Having characterised the optimal inflation target, we now turn to the case where delegation takes the
form of a simple linear inflation contract. Walsh (1995) has shown that - in the absence of uncertainty
about central bank preferences - such a contract can remove the inflation bias under discretion while
still allowing the central bank to react optimally to supply shocks.
Thus, the trade-off between credibility and flexibility as emphasised by Rogoff (1985) and others is
eliminated, and the pre-commitment outcome can be attained.
The contract adds a linear cost to the central bank's loss function.  Let the added linear cost to
inflation be  () f 1 pp -
*, where  f1is a constant.
Then the central bank is assigned the loss function
() () () [] () Ly y x f
CB =- + --+ -
1
2
1
22
1
** * pp pp (4.1)
The central bank chooses inflation so as to minimise (4.1) subject to (2.1) having observed the supply
shock and taking inflation expectations as given.
From the first-order condition we obtain the following reaction function:
() () pp p p e =+
-
-- +-
-
** * 1
22
1
x
y
f
x
e (4.2)
As before, the term () ppe
* -+
e is the output level consistent with the socially optimal inflation rate
p
*, i.e. the output level that follows upon substituting p
*for p in (2.1). If y
*exceeds this level, then
the central bank has an incentive to set inflation above the social optimum.
Comparing (4.2) and (3.2) it can be seen that the central bank's reaction function under a linear
inflation contract looks very similar to the reaction function under the optimal inflation target. In both
cases the effects of preference shocks on inflation are asymmetric, with positive shocks increasing
inflation by more than negative shocks decreasing it. There are two diferences. The first is that in
(4.2) the government imposed inflation target p
b is replaced by the socially optimal inflation rate.
Secondly, under a linear contract inflation decreases with  f1. The reason is that an increase in
f1raises the central banker's marginal loss from higher inflation.
Taking expectations (at time t -1) of the central bank's reaction function under a linear contract gives
inflation expectations as
() pp
e yf =+ -
** F 1 (4.3)12
where the term F has the same meaning as in the private sector's forecasting rule under an optimal
inflation target.
12
Please  note that, unlike Beetsma and Jensen (1997), uncertainty about the central banker's
preferences increases inflation expectations. The intuition is similar to the case of the optimal inflation
target. Positive preference shocks are more inflationary than negative shocks are disinflationary.
Hence with equal probabilities of positive and negative shocks expected inflation will be adjusted
upwards, and the more so the higher the variance term inF.
From expression (4.3) it is clear that inflation is expected to exceed its social optimum whenever
yf
* > 1 , in which case the marginal benefits of inflation are greater than the marginal costs, i.e. the
incentive to inflate dominates the disciplining effect of the contract.
Inserting (4.3) back into (4.2) actual inflation is
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As in the case of the optimal inflation target, it is important to realise that monetary policy does not
coincide with policy in the absence of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences. If we set the
preference shock equal to zero in (4.4) monetary policy will still react to the variance term in F.
Thus, in this respect certainty equivalence does not hold. The reason is that the central banker
optimises its policy by taking inflation expectations as given. Since inflation expectations depend on
the variance of the preference shocks (through Jensen's inequality; see expression (4.3)) so does the
central bank's reaction function.
Combining (4.4) and (2.1) yields realised output:
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As in the case of the optimal inflation target, inflation and output deviate from their expected values
when either  x or e differ from their (zero) expected values. But compared with (3.5) and (3.6), the
solutions for inflation and output differ in an important aspect: the delegation parameter  f1, now
affects how uncertainty about the central banker's preferences feed into inflation and output.
Here we show that their result still holds if private sector inflation expectations depend on the
uncertainty about preferences.
                                               
12 The derivation is similar to the case of an optimal inflation target, for more details see Appendix A.13
For the moment, suppose that the supply shock is zero.  From (4.2) it can be seen that the contract
affects the inflation rate through two channels.  The first channel operates directly by increasing the
marginal loss of inflation.  Consider a marginal increase in  f1 starting from  f1 0 = .  The direct effect
is then given by the term -- fx 1 2 / .  So this effect is uncertain and ultimately depends on the
realisation of  x .  The second, indirect channel operates through inflation expectations.  Here it is
equal to -Ff1 (see equation (4.3))
13.
The combined direct and indirect effects of the contract imply that any deviation of  x from its (zero)
expected value will have smaller effects on actual inflation and output. Thus, with a contract in place
, i.e.  f1 0 > , - contrary to the case of an optimal inflation target - the transmission of preference
shocks to inflation and output is dampened.
Now, consider the effects of a supply shock. The transmission of this shock to inflation and output is
affected by the preference shock. Consider a positive realisation of  x . This means that there is more
emphasis on output stabilisation which increases the willingness of the central bank to accommodate
supply shocks. Hence, the higher  x the more such shocks are dampened before they pass on to
output. The flipside of the coin is that inflation volatility is less well cared for. Of course, if  xis
negative the reverse is true. Then, the central bank dampens the impact effect from the supply shock
on inflation and output is allowed to fluctuate more.
Under a linear contract, i.e. if  f1 0 > , it is clear that the role of fluctuating preferences in the
transmission of supply shocks to inflation and output is significantly reduced. Thus, there will be less
scope for the central bank to impose its 'own' preferences on society and distort stabilisation policy by
'overstabilising' either inflation or output.
This can also be seen from the expressions for the variances of inflation and output
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Through the first term on the right hand side of (4.6) the contract affects the variability of inflation
and, through (4.7)), of output.
                                               
13  In the BJ model the direct effect is deterministic and - using the notation of this paper - equal to - f1 2 / .  BJ have
no effect from preference uncertainty on expected inflation so F®1 and the indirect effect in their model is - f1.14
To find the optimal linear inflation contract, the government chooses  f1so as to minimise  L
G subject
to (4.3), (4.4), and (4.5). Using the first-order condition, the optimal value of  f1, denoted by f1
*, is
given by:
14
fy 1
** = (4.8)
This expression reveals that it is optimal to offer a linear inflation contract to a central banker that
does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences. This is in sharp contrast to
Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal linear contract does depend on the degree of
preference uncertainty.
Please note that our result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for the case without preference uncertainty.
Hence, contrary to BJ for the case of a linear contract, certainty equivalence does hold. The value  f1
*
corresponds to the optimal Walsh contract in the absence of uncertainty about central bank
preferences.
5 The Linear Walsh Contract versus the Svensson Inflation Target
In this section we compare the outcomes for inflation and output under a Walsh contract with the
outcomes under a Svensson inflation target.  In absence of uncertainty about the central banker’s
preferences, Svensson (1997) has shown that the linear Walsh contract is equivalent with the
Svensson inflation target.  Both achieve optimal stabilization without an inflationary bias.  We will
show that this equivalence no longer holds when disturbances to the central banker’s preferences are
introduced.
Optimal Linear Inflation Contract:
Under  the optimal linear inflation contract the inflationary bias is eliminated so that expected inflation
is equal to the inflation target (this can be seen from (4.3)). Thus the credibility problem is solved. To
see how the linear contract performs with respect to stabilisation policy we need to look at the
variances on inflation and output. By substituting  fy 1 =
* into (4.6) and (4.7) we get
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Optimal Inflation Target:
The optimal  Svensson inflation target also solves the credibility problem. So in this respect it is
identical to the linear inflation contract. However, its stabilisation properties are different from the
linear inflation contract.
The variances of inflation and output under an optimal inflation target can be found by substituting
pp
b y =-
** F into (3.7) and (3.8). This yields
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Comparing (5.1) and (5.2), it is clear that in the presence of uncertainty about the central banker’s
preferences the Walsh contract unambiguously yields a lower variance of inflation and a lower
variance of output than the Svensson inflation target. This means that the optimal linear inflation
contract yields a lower expected loss to the government and, therefore, is strictly superior to the
optimal inflation target.  This result is similar to BJ.  However, in their model stabilisation policy
under a linear inflation contract is at the cost of expected inflation being below the socially optimal
inflation rate. This trade-off is not present in this paper.
The intuition behind this result is simple. In Section 3 we showed that with an inflation target, the
delegation parameter p
b, has no effect on how the uncertainty about the central banker's preferences
is transmitted to inflation and output. Put differently, the choice of the inflation target has no
implications  for  stabilisation policy. Thus, the variances of output and inflation are independent from
the choice of inflation target.
From Section 4 we know that this is no longer true under a linear contract. With the optimal contract
in place, i.e.  fy 1
** = , - contrary to the case of an optimal inflation target - the transmission of
preference shocks to inflation and output is dampened. Because the role of fluctuating preferences in
the transmission of supply shocks to inflation and output is significantly reduced, the variances of
inflation and output will be lower than in the case of an optimal inflation target.16
The policy implications of this result are clear. It suggests that - in the presence of uncertainty about
the central banker's preferences - the best institutional arrangement is to grant the central bank
instrument independence and to make it accountable for its monetary policy  performance by
imposing a linear inflation contract. Moreover, this delegation arrangement has the appealing
property that the optimal linear inflation contract is independent from the degree of preference
uncertainty. So there is no need for the government (the principal) to make delegation arrangements
conditional on this uncertainty. In other words, the legislator needs less information than in the case
of the optimal inflation target (where the target does depend on s x
2) and still reaps the rewards of
better stabilisation policy than in the case where policy is set by a central bank with  an optimal
inflation target.
6. Quadratic Contracts
Even though the optimal linear contract is superior to the optimal inflation target, it does not achieve
the pre-commitment solution. The reason is that the interaction between the supply shocks and
preference uncertainty generates excess macroeconomic variability.
We address this problem by expanding the set of admissable contracts to include quadratic contracts.
A quadratic contract penalises quadratic (squared) deviations of inflation from some target.
Combination of a Linear and a Quadratic Contract
More specificly, to moderate the excess macroeconomic variability under the linear inflation contract
we examine the combination of a linear and a quadratic contract. Let the added quadratic cost to
inflation be  () f 2
2
pp -
* , where  f2  is a constant. Then the central bank is assigned the loss function
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22
1
2 2
pp pp pp
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From (6.1) it can be seen that - if  f2 0 > - the quadratic contract is mathematically equivalent to
Rogoff's (1985) conservative central banker. Of course, if this parameter is negative, we have a
liberal central banker.
The optimal delegation arrangement is found in two steps. The first step is to solve for the optimal
linear contract, taking  f2  as given. The second step is to solve for the optimal value of  f2 .17
As was shown in the previous section, the variances of inflation and output do not depend on the
parameters of the Walsh contract when the parameter  f1is optimally chosen. Adding a quadratic
penalty on inflation does not change the optimal Walsh contract.  Therefore, in this section we have
two independent instruments for two problems.  We use the linear penalty term to eliminate the
inflationary bias and we use the quadratic term to minimise the welfare loss to society caused by the
variance of inflation and output.  The quadratic term then brings a trade-off between the variance of
inflation and the variance of output as is well-known from the Rogoff model. From Appendix D it
follows that the optimal combination of a linear and a quadratic contract is
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Thus, in order to mitigate excess macroeconomic variability - due to the interaction between supply
shocks and preference shocks - the linear Walsh contract needs to be augmented with a conservative
central banker. This result was first found  by Herrendorf and Lockwood (1997). Here we show that
their result - which follows from information asymmetries between a monopolistic trade union and the
political principal with respect to productivity shocks - continues to hold in our setting.
15  The Walsh
contract cum conservative central banker result is also found by Beetsma and Jensen (1997). Thus,
the Herrendorf-Lockwood result appears to be very robust indeed.
Combination of an inflation target and a quadratic contract
As was shown in the previous section the optimal inflation target performs worse - in terms of social
welfare - than the optimal linear contract. More specificly, because the inflation target has no effect
on the transmission of uncertainty about the central banker's preferences to inflation and output,
macroeconomic variability is higher than with an optimal linear contract. Thus, social welfare with an
optimal inflation target will be even further away from the first-best pre-commitment outcome than in
the case of a linear contract.
To mitigate this sub-optimal volatility, we now consider a combination of an optimal inflation target
and a quadratic contract. Under this delegation  scheme the central banker minimises
                                               
15 As can be seen in Appendix D, the combination of an optimal linear Walsh contract and a quadratic contract gives
the Rogoff result that the variance of inflation decreases with f2 whereas the variance of output increases with f2 (for
s x
2  sensibly small).18
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As before, the optimal delegation arrangement is found in two steps. The first step is to solve for the
optimal inflation target, taking  f2  as given. The second step is to solve for the optimal value of f2.
As was shown in the previous section, the variances of inflation and output do not depend on the
inflation target p
b. Thus, adding a quadratic penalty on inflation does not change the optimal
inflation target.  This means that, -  as before - we now have two independent instruments for two
problems.  We use the inflation target to eliminate the inflationary bias, and we use the quadratic
contract to minimize the welfare loss to society caused by the excess macroeconomic variability.
From Appendix  D it follows that the optimal combination of an inflation target and a quadratic
contract is
pp
b y
** * *, =- F ff 22
** * > (6.4)
From (6.4) it follows that the Svensson optimal inflation target (which already depends on the degree
of preference uncertainty), also has to be augmented with a conservative central banker. Moreover, in
Appendix D we show that now the central banker has to be even more conservative. The additional
variance that the inflation target generates, compared to the Walsh result, can unambiguously be
reduced by making the central banker more conservative. This explains why the central banker has to
be even more conservative when he is assigned a Svensson target instead of a linear Walsh contract.
7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we have investigated the effects of uncertain central bank preferences for the optimal
institutional design of monetary policy. We have studied this in the context of a model that goes
beyond 'pure' uncertainty. This means that we have relaxed the Beetsma and Jensen (1997) restriction
that the central banker's preference uncertainty has no effect on private sector inflation expectations.
As shown in the paper this implies that monetary policy will on average not coincide with policy in
the absence of uncertainty.  In this respect certainty equivalence does not hold. The reason is that the
central bank optimises its policy, taking inflation expectations as given. Since private sector inflation
expectations now depend on the degree of preference uncertainty (being the variance of the
preference shock) so does monetary policy. Hence, through the expectations channel, preference19
uncertainty now has systematic (as opposed to transitory) effects on policy. The implications of
allowing the uncertainty to play a bigger role are substantial.
First, the optimal inflation target that has to be imposed on the central banker now depends on the
degree of preference uncertainty, and has to be stricter (lower) the higher the uncertainty. The reason
is that central banker uncertainty implies higher inflation expectations. To offset this additional
inflation bias the degree of 'target conservativeness' has to increase as well.
This is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal inflation target does
not depend on the degree of preference uncertainty and is the same as in the Svensson (1997) model.
Therefore in our model - contrary to BJ - certainty equivalence does not hold, and the optimal
inflation target with uncertain central bank preferences does not correspond to the optimal target
derived by Svensson (1997) in the absence of uncertainty about central bank preferences.
Further, for the case of the Walsh contract we find that it is optimal to offer a linear inflation contract
to a central banker that does not depend on the degree of uncertainty about its preferences. Again,
this is in sharp contrast to Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that the optimal linear contract does
depend on the degree of preference uncertainty. Here our result is the same as in Walsh (1995) for
the case without preference uncertainty. Hence, contrary to BJ for the case of a linear contract
certainty equivalence does hold, and the optimal linear inflation contract with uncertain central bank
preferences is identical to the optimal Walsh contract in the absence of uncertainty about central bank
preferences.
Next, comparing the linear Walsh contract and the optimal inflation target, we find that the optimal
linear inflation contract yields a lower expected loss to the government and therefore is strictly
superior to the optimal inflation target. This result is similar to BJ. However, in their model
stabilisation policy under a linear inflation contract is at the cost of expected inflation being below the
socially optimal inflation rate. This trade-off is not present in this paper.
To conclude, we find that in case of uncertain central banker preferences the optimal delegation
arrangement is a combination of a linear inflation contract and a quadratic contract. Here the
quadratic contract is equivalent to a Rogoff (1985) conservative central banker. Again, this is
different from Beetsma and Jensen (1997), who find that a combination of a linear inflation contract,
an inflation target and a quadratic contract performs best.
The policy implications of this result are clear. It suggests that - in the presence of uncertainty about
the central banker's preferences - the best institutional arrangement is to select a central banker that is
more inflation averse than society, grant the central bank instrument independence and to make it
accountable for its monetary policy  performance by imposing a linear inflation contract. Moreover,
this delegation arrangement has the appealing property that the optimal linear inflation contract is
independent from the degree of preference uncertainty. Thus, there is no need for the government20
(the principal) to make delegation arrangements conditional on this uncertainty. In other words the
legislator needs less information than in the case of the optimal inflation target (where the target does
depend on s x
2) and still reaps the rewards of better stabilisation policy than in the case where policy
is set by a central bank with  an optimal inflation target.
Appendix A Private Sector Inflation Expectations
Optimal Inflation Target
Taking expectations across expression (3.2):
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This expression requires us to take the expected value of ratios of random variables. This can be
achieved through a Taylor series expansion.
Our problem is to expand f() / zx y =  about the respective means. Assuming that the first two
moments of E(x/y) exist we can write down the expression
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This is the (second-order) approximation used in the paper, therefore we can write
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So substituting (A.3) in (A.1) and rearranging gives
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which is expression (3.3) in the text.  Again, it is clear that as s x
2 0 ® the first part of the expression
on the right hand side collapses to unity, and (A.4) is equivalent to (3.4).
Linear Inflation Contract
The derivation of private sector expectations for the case of a linear inflation contract is similar to the
case of an optimal inflation target (see above).21
Appendix B The Optimal Inflation Target
Since the choice of inflation target does not affect the stochastic components of the governments
expected loss, its problem is
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The first-order condition (FOC) for minimising (B.1) with respect to p
b is
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It follows that the FOC can be written as
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* (B.3)
Substituting (3.3) for p
e yields
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which is equation (3.9) in the main text.22
Appendix C The Optimal Linear Contract
The governments problem is
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subject to (4.3), (4.7) and (4.8)
The first-order condition (FOC) for minimising (B.1) with respect to  f1 is
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Substituting for p
e  from (4.3) and using that ¶p ¶
e f / 1 =- F we get
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Then expanding 
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Finally, using that from (4.7) 
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the government's FOC can be written as
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It can be easily seen that the optimal linear contract then is23
fy 1
* * = (C.6)
which is equation (4.8) in the main text.
Appendix D Quadratic Contracts
Optimal quadratic contract with optimal Walsh contract
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The optimal value for f2 is found at
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 , () G ¥= 0, and G is monotonically decreasing in  f2 , there is a unique
solution to (D.3).
Optimal quadratic contract with optimal Svensson target
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The optimal value for f2 is found at
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Comparing (D.6) to (D.3) it is clear that the solution to (D.6) is found at a higher value for  f2 . So we
need a more conservative central bank under a Svensson inflation target than with a linear Walsh
contract.
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